What are best practices and models of cooperation against transnational organized crime? For 25 years, the Financial Action Taskforce (FATF) provides an important example of how states can collaborate to counter money laundering. Anti-money laundering policies are used against criminals and terrorists, and seem to be a prime example of effective coordination among states.
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To show this in detail, this article traces the transformation of the anti-money laundering agenda from a foreign policy of the United States to a global discourse and an almost universal weapon against crime.
3 The first section presents the role of global policy networks and how they can be established. I outline two major difficulties of establishing global networksinitiation problems and commitment problems. The second section shows how and why the FATF was initiated, emphasizing the crucial role of the United States. The third section elaborates on the instruments used to ensure commitment, in particular how monitoring and oversight has been socialized in the FATF. The fourth section presents reasons related to incentives and commitment that are obstacles to replicating the FATF. The conclusions summarize the weak points of the FATF network in terms of transferability, outline some ways to overcome these and present further questions for research.
The article is related to the existing research on the FATF, which has multiplied over the last years, yet often does not elaborate on limits of the FATF in terms of policy lessons. By addressing the question of whether and how the FATF is replicable in other contexts of global crime governance, the article carries out a secondary analysis of the available research and sources, and supplements the existent literature from a more policy-oriented perspective. The 
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analysis has important implications, as future models of global governance networks might fail if they are modelled as a copy of the FATF, but are actually based on different preconditions.
Global Networks and Global Crime Governance
International cooperation was for many decades primarily treaty-based interaction of states with defined commitments and benefits. 4 Since the end of the Cold War, however, also informal ways of cooperation or 'soft law' have grown continuously, ultimately giving rise to many forms of interaction among governmental and non-governmental actors. 5 'Informal' here does not refer to non-official channels, or a 'hidden' membership, but to the fact that an increasing number of arrangements in world politics are less bureaucratic and rely on nonbinding agreements. Informalization thus implies increased flexibility of structures and a more flexible decision-making process.
The global governance of crime reflects this informalization process. A global public policy network consisting of international organizations, states and non-state actors, 6 is a concept followed in the Kimberley Process. The process brought together governmental and non-governmental regulations to govern sections of the diamond trade that had been 5 unregulated before. 7 Global networks of state actors that facilitate exchange about common policy problems 8 have also become an established element of global crime governance, ranging from police cooperation to activities of the G7/8 against crime. 9 Global crime governance today is transnational governance, relying on non-state actors and their orchestration. 10 The FATF is one of the most prominent examples of these efforts to counter crime.
While these different forms of policy networks vary in the degree of involvement of state and non-state actors, the tasks fulfilled, and the legal forms they take, they nonetheless all expose a new, networked way in how states tackle crime.
11 Basically, governments can use these networks in two ways: They can try to stipulate change among network members, or they can try to use the power of the network as a whole to govern a specific issue area. To make efficient use of networks, actors ideally combine these strategies and set up a network in which they have a strong influence on other network members, while the whole network has a strong influence on the whole issue area. This turns networking into a multilevel activity, and requires an 'entrepreneurial' approach to world politics: States cannot just refer to existing international forums or use long established means of cooperation. Peter Andreas and Ethan Nadelmann, Policing the Globe.; Author.
9 design: While the interstate treaty has been the most important tool in early activities against crime, the current attempts to counter crime show a networked structure, and are not necessarily based on hard law. This is not to say that hard and soft law, diplomacy, power and treaties would exclude each other. Rather, the more formal instruments of treaties that reflected global power in early global crime control have given way to more informal arrangements, like global networks, in which power is nonetheless still present and used.
Problems related to Global Networking
While institutional entrepreneurs can draw on networks in a flexible way, this form of cooperation is not without specific costs. A main reason for formalized cooperation with binding contracts are commitment problems, making sure that all parties fulfill the agreement.
In contrast, networks apply soft law and are more flexible with regard to membership, but this also lowers the costs of defection. While the flexibility of networks seems to be an advantage, it also needs incentives and other measures that ensure the commitment of network members.
At the same time, networks might only play out their advantages over time as they do not have the fixed benefits and gains that other, formal treaties have. Initiators of networks need to invest in them early and constantly, to make sure the networking pays off to them and other members in the long run.
Initiating and designing policy networks therefore needs to consider a) initiation problems and b) commitment problems. Both are not independent from each other, and in particular the initiator of networks needs to tackle both of them. But while initiation problems mainly relate to early stages of the network's existence, commitment problems are continuous problem that might even increase as the number of network members and activities grow. A design that considers these commitment problems and, ideally, diffuses responsibility to all members, is therefore necessary, as a network initiator is unlikely to be able monitoring commitment alone constantly.
As the FATF is usually considered to be a success in global standard setting and resulting policy change, and even discussed as a model for new initiatives, this article analyzes how such network problems have been solved to counter money laundering. Money laundering is usually conceived as a 'support crime', enabling other, more severe forms of criminal activity, and represents the process by which the criminal origin of money is hidden by converting it to an income that seems to be generated by licit activity. Laundering money thus enables criminals to effectively use the gains derived from illegal activities like drug trafficking, maritime piracy, weapons trafficking or the financing of terrorism.
18 Chasing this money is important to find and destroy criminal businesses, and detecting this money also diminishes the economic revenue of illicit activities and makes them less attractive. 19 The United States first identified money laundering as an international area of concern, but also witnessed substantial resistance from other states. The global anti-money laundering agenda provides an important example of how an entrepreneurial approach to world politics helped overcoming obstacles. At the same time, as any entrepreneurial activity, the success of the FATF model is not necessarily replicable. States would enforce its own laws rigorously, transactions from other countries could not be controlled effectively. Moreover, the banking sector complained massively about a growing burden of paper work and diminishing banking privacy at times when financial markets were becoming globalized and increasingly competitive. 
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Other Incentives to Initiate the FATF The incentives that led the United States to push anti-money laundering policies via the G7
were not primarily linked to domestic reasons, but to a lack of international alternatives.
Traditional instruments as bilateral law enforcement cooperation or developing mutual legal assistance treaties had proven to be ineffective: Foreign governments were generally reluctant to grant assistance to drug-related law enforcement cooperation when the death penalty was included in the American 1988 Omnibus Drug Act. Also, even cooperative countries referred to the needs of their own banking sectors and the need for privacy, and foreign courts partly dismissed assistance that American law enforcement was seeking from the respective It was also problematic to establish effective sanctioning mechanisms along such treaties.
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Taken together, the growing number of international financial transactions made it ineffective for the United States to rely only on a domestic approach of money laundering
control. Yet, bilateral treaties provided no way of assuring that foreign banking procedures would be aligned with American regulations. 31 These reasons contributed to the growing efforts of the United States to counter money laundering on a multilateral base.
Being the central network formed to fight money laundering, the inception of the FATF in 1989 was formally proposed by the French who held the presidency of the G7 at that time. 30 "Report to the Chairman", General Accounting Office, 56.
31 "Report to the Chairman", General Accounting Office, 57-8. to encourage the criminalization of money laundering and increase the possibilities for crossnational law enforcement, as well as fostering broad international cooperation against money laundering.
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With regard to the initiation problem of international networks, the FATF shows that the United States had no domestic alternative to an international regulation of money laundering. Also, given the sovereignty of countries in overseeing their banks, even treaties on money laundering regulation, changed banking practice and law enforcement cooperation would have been futile. There was, however, a clear sense of where most money related to drug offences (the initial focus of the FATF) was generated -in Western countries where drugs are foremost consumed -and where the money would be laundered -in offshore banking centers.
Incentives for cooperation where thus high, while the tools for cooperation were restricted.
Incentives to Commit to the FATF Network
The creation of the FATF lead to the emergence of money laundering as a prominent international policy problem. Commitment of states was nonetheless necessary to counter this crime. However, over the course of time, it was not only the United States who took over monitoring tasks, but reviews and sanctions became a multilateral responsibility and has also been delegated to non-state actors.
Incentives for governmental commitment to the FATF
33 "Report to the Chairman", General Accounting Office, 59.
With regard to internal monitoring, the structure of the FATF allows expert exchange and discussion forums on the most effective methods to counter money laundering. The network also subjects non-members to its review procedures: From the late 1990s until 2006, these countries have been monitored through an assessment in the framework of the non-cooperative countries and territories (NCCT) process. A first report was issued in 2000
and included a list of countries that seemed to be non-compliant to the recommendations. These and other subsequently listed countries were neither members of the FATF nor did they sign up for the recommendations. Instead, the NCCT process was a 'naming and shaming' approach towards non-members, supplemented by counter-measures and sanctions. 38 The process was heavily criticized because it implied that a club of countries assesses non-member compliance to its own rules. Units. All in all, the United States successfully managed to create and shape a global network that nowadays serves as a prototype of networked governance.
The central position of the United States leads to the ability of effectively communicating foreign policy goals related to money laundering. In 1991, the General Accounting Office concluded that 'There has been some progress on the international front in recent years' and 'International negotiations are leading to significant agreements'. 50 The United States supported the start of and early agenda setting of the global network. The design of the FATF network, its exchange and multilayered monitoring ensured that the political goals were spread widely and that actors were committed to them.
Limits of Transferability
The FATF network could overcome initiation and commitment problems in a unique way. With regard to the initiation of the FATF, the United States invested political and financial resources as well as expertise to start global, and later regional, networks that tackled money laundering.
This was the outcome of domestic politics that demanded international activity, while all usual instruments had been unsuitable to reach this political goal. It is rare, however, that these conditions for the initiation of a network are met. Domestic preferences for internationalization are not always as pronounced as in the case of money laundering, where decades of domestic regulation were ineffective due to the internationalization of financial markets. Moreover, not always are countries willing to finance new institutions with an unclear outcome as this was the case of the FATF.
The talk about money laundering, and the successive introduction of worldwide rules and regulations related to the FATF network also opened up possibilities that reach beyond criminal finance. As the FATF regulations established a dense net of control about customer data and transfers, they also became an instrument for executing financial sanctions more effectively, irrespective of whether these are linked to money laundering or based on other reasons. As such, anti-money laundering regulations are instruments that, once introduced, can be used for very different purposes, from tracing tax avoidance to sanctioning countries. This added value of the FATF makes continuous political support of central FATF members likely.
Global policy networks that cannot provide this added value are less likely to exist as long and expand that successfully.
An even more complex task is ensuring commitment while not overburdening the initiator of the network. The FATF network -perhaps because it had been so innovative at the time it was established, has effectively a structure that is based on intermediaries, different levels of surveillance and crosses the public-private divide. 
24
eventually also among other states. The asymmetry created by the initial FATF network, helped establishing the rules, be them formally binding or non-binding. A soft law initiative that starts from a broader membership base could be less effective, as it needs to bridge across more diverse member interests. Common rules and the commitment to enforcement is harder to achieve in such cases. Most importantly, the naming-and-shaming strategy of the FATF has been successful in causing policy change in non-member countries. However, given the FATF recommendations include sanctioning power, naming-and-shaming by the FATF has always been more than just a discourse. Countries that had been listed on the blacklist were well aware that this listing is a first, diplomatic step and that other steps like sanctioning might follow.
Given that the FATF can cut-off a national financial market from others, any reaction to naming-and-shaming is not independent from the 'harder' tools that FATF could apply. Other cases of naming and shaming might be less effective if no backing by other instruments exists.
Finally, despite the fact that FATF regulations influenced policy making world-wide, the effectiveness and the legitimacy of these regulations is still not undisputed. The inclusion of banks and other financial professions has led to a transnational regulatory regime, leaving implementation to non-state actors. These are not always well-equipped to take over policing tasks, and who is ultimately responsible for failures is unclear. Moreover, the acknowledgement of FATF regulations worldwide is not necessarily a signal of legitimacy, and many countries, including the United States and FATF members, might follow rules on paper but not in practice. These difficulties, however, are not unique to the FATF, but remain persistent problems of global governance in all issue areas.
Conclusions: The FATF and Policy Learning
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The analysis of the FATF shows that research and practice benefits from taking into account the conditions that accompany specific networks. The FATF has an impressive track record of expertise and policy-development, rarely achieved by other global governance networks. As the article showed, it is a particularly prominent example of how state and non-state actors can network globally and across different levels. Yet, from a policy-oriented perspective this success does not imply that the FATF would provide the best example for future global networks. The initiation of the FATF was not only supported by a powerful group of countries, but the gains that were to be achieved -like security of financial markets and countering crime -were particularly attractive to those countries where most drug-and crime related money was entering the financial system. A lack of alternatives helped the FATF to gain momentum. The multilevel structure of the FATF, linked to monitoring and effective sanctioning further allowed ensuring commitment to the network and its rules. The combined presence of these conditions for initiation and commitment is rare, which puts limits on the transferability of the FATF to other areas of global governance.
The FATF nonetheless provides an important case for policy learning, when paying attention to these background conditions. With regard to initiation, global networks seem to need a dedicated political supporter from the beginning. Initial political support is necessary 26 for all forms of international cooperation, yet given that the network structure is more flexible, this support will be needed for a longer period of time. Moreover, policy preferences must be focused, so that commitment of the initiator and all those joining the network can be monitored easily. The network must allow for effective sharing of the burden at some point, so that monitoring is not carried out only by the initiating actor. This is particularly important with regard to dissent in the network, as the less coherent policy interests of members are, the more likely is defection and non-commitment. As a result, even ambitious initiatives against crime might become irrelevant over time. Venezuela has been a known defector of the scheme, and was never confronted with harsh sanctions as FATF defectors would be. This is also due to the fact that some sanctioning tools of the FATF -in particular restricting access to global financial markets -are not available to other global policy networks.
53 Virginia Haufler, "The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme"; Author
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Most prominently expressed in the idea that 'it takes a network to destroy a network', 54 new forms of cooperation have been discussed in global crime governance for a while. The growth of networks like the FATF seem to lend support to such an approach. As this article shows, however, there are limits of lesson-drawing from existent global policy networks. These limits exist with regard to policies, but also with regard to scholarly knowledge on the success and failure of networks. They include networks related to global crime governance and those in other areas of global governance. Future research should compare and examine networks and their development more closely to fill this gap.
